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Currently, women account for approximately 15.7% of legislators 
worldwide.1  Out of 184 countries, only seventeen (approximately 
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 1. See INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS, WORLD 
AVERAGES (revealing regional differences in that women occupy 39.9% of 
parliamentary seats in Nordic countries, but occupy less than 20% of such seats in 
every other world region), at http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm (last modified 
Feb. 28, 2005). 
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nine percent) possess a critical mass of at least thirty percent female 
parliamentarians.2  Many of these seventeen countries utilize some 
form of “positive discrimination” mechanism or gender quota to 
increase women’s political representation.3 
The three primary types of gender quotas are constitutional quotas, 
election law quotas, and party level quotas.4  Much gender quota 
literature focuses on constitutional or party level quotas that require a 
specified percentage of female candidates on party lists or that 
prohibit more than a certain percentage of candidates of one gender 
per party list.5  This Comment focuses on the United States 
Democratic Party’s party level quotas.6  According to the Democratic 
Party’s Equal Division Rule, “[t]he National Convention shall be 
composed of delegates equally divided between men and women.”7 
Equal division rules, like the one set forth by the Democratic Party, 
are more facially progressive than gender quotas, which require only 
that women serve as candidates for office.8  Implementation of 
                                                          
 2. See id. (listing countries possessing at least thirty percent female 
parliamentarians in a lower or single house: Rwanda (48.8%), Sweden (45.3%), 
Norway (38.2%), Finland (37.5%), Denmark (36.9%), Netherlands (36.7%), Cuba 
(36%), Spain (36%), Costa Rica (35.1%), Mozambique (34.8%), Belgium (34.7%), 
Austria (33.9%), Argentina (33.7%), South Africa (32.8%), Germany (32.8%), 
Guyana (30.8%), and Iceland (30.2%)); see also Joni Lovenduski, Women & Politics: 
Minority Representation or Critical Mass?, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 743, 744 (2001) 
(acknowledging thirty percent as the critical mass or level that enables female 
legislators to effectively create and promote policy objectives).  But see Susan Roth, 
Women of the Senate Come into Their Own as Their Numbers Grow, GANNETT NEWS 
SERV., TABLE 6, July 6, 2003 (arguing that female Senators in the United States 
currently enjoy the ability to influence policymaking despite the fact they do not 
numerically constitute a critical mass). 
 3. See PIPPA NORRIS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING: VOTING RULES AND POLITICAL 
BEHAVIOR 191 (Cambridge U. Press 2004) (distinguishing between statutory gender 
quotas, voluntary gender quotas, and reserved seats). 
 4. See INT’L IDEA & STOCKHOLM U., GLOBAL DATABASE OF QUOTAS FOR WOMEN 
(defining constitutional quotas as provisions established in a country’s constitution, 
election law quotas as provisions established in the regulations or national legislation 
of a country, and party level quotas as political party measures used to ensure a 
percentage of female candidates or female party leaders), at 
http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutQuotas.cfm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005). 
 5. See, e.g., NORRIS, supra note 3, at 192-98 (summarizing the various affirmative 
action measures implemented in Europe, Latin America, and Africa to increase 
women’s political representation). 
 6. See DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., THE CHARTER AND BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC 
PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, art. II, § 4 (as amended Jan. 19, 2002) [hereinafter 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER] (requiring gender-balanced state delegations at national 
conventions), available at http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/ charter.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2005). 
 7. See id. at art. VII, § 6 (mandating that equal division of delegate and 
committee positions fails to breach the Party’s nondiscrimination policy). 
 8. See Miki Caul, Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender 
Quotas: A Cross-National Analysis, 63 J. POL. 1214, 1226 (2001) (asserting that parties 
may adopt candidate quotas to superficially demonstrate their adherence to gender 
equality). 
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gender quotas does not automatically guarantee the election of 
women.9  Theoretically, political parties could place women in the 
lowest available spots on party lists, thus minimizing their chances of 
winning office despite the parties’ official compliance with the gender 
quota.10  Equal division rules, on the other hand, like reserved seats, 
guarantee women half of the available slots in institutions.11 
This Comment defends the Democratic Party’s Equal Division Rule 
as constitutionally sound.12  Part I addresses the history of gender-
balance legislation in the two major American political parties.13  Part 
II examines the Equal Division Rule’s validity with regard to freedom 
of association, voting rights, political question doctrine, and state 
action.14  Part III discusses Equal Protection defenses of the Rule 
according to gender-based discrimination and affirmative action 
law.15 
The successful establishment of political party gender quotas in the 
United States proves remarkable in light of both the controversy 
surrounding affirmative action16 and constitutional and statutory 
provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sex.17  Judicial 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., Garance Franke-Ruta, Liberté, Egalité, Sororité, LEGAL AFF., 
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 32 (noting that the French parity law requiring gender-balanced 
candidate lists resulted in a mere 1.4% increase in the proportion of female 
parliamentarians). 
 10. See, e.g., Mark P. Jones, Increasing Women’s Representation Via Gender 
Quotas: the Argentine Ley de Cupos, 16 WOMEN & POL. 75, 87-88 (1996) (finding that 
Argentinian parties either have disregarded quota law requirements or have complied 
minimally, placing women in the lowest permissible slots). 
 11. See, e.g., Pippa Norris, Breaking the Barriers: Positive Discrimination Policies 
for Women, in HAS LIBERALISM FAILED WOMEN? ASSURING EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89, 93-94 (Jytte Klausen & Charles S. Maier eds., 
2001) (noting the advantages and disadvantages of reserved seat systems, which 
several countries have implemented to benefit women, ethnic groups, and religious 
minorities). 
 12. See infra notes 71-217 and accompanying text (asserting that the Rule 
withstands freedom of association, voting rights, political question, state action, and 
gender-based Equal Protection scrutiny, but may falter under affirmative action 
analysis). 
 13. See infra notes 20-70 and accompanying text (reviewing Democratic and 
Republican Party initiatives intended to attract female electors and party members). 
 14. See infra notes 71-170 and accompanying text (concluding that the Equal 
Division Rule does not violate electors’ freedom of association and voting rights).  
Rather, the Rule constitutes a non-justiciable political question.  Id.  Alternatively, the 
Rule does not involve state actors, thus precluding the validity of Equal Protection 
claims targeting the Equal Division Rule.  Id. 
 15. See infra notes 171-217 and accompanying text (arguing that proponents 
should rely on gender-based classification analysis rather than affirmative action 
analysis to defend the Rule). 
 16. See, e.g., Terry M. Neal & David S. Broder, Affirmative Action Tears at Fla. 
GOP, WASH. POST, May 15, 1999, at A1 (acknowledging affirmative action as a divisive 
issue among the electorate, capable of determining voters’ political affiliation). 
 17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating states’ provision of “equal 
protection of the laws” to all citizens); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (prohibiting 
3
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deference to political parties has enabled the continued 
implementation of measures requiring gender-balanced party 
leadership and state delegations.18  The persistence of such measures 
suggests that, in certain circumstances, courts apply a lenient level of 
scrutiny, guaranteeing the preservation of benign gender 
discrimination measures.19 
I. THE ORIGINS OF EQUAL DIVISION RULES 
A. Democratic and Republican Party Charters, Bylaws, and Rules 
The Democratic and Republican Parties,20 as well as select states,21 
have long required gender-balanced national or state committees.22  
The Republican Party rule concerning state delegations, however, is 
worded more loosely than its Democratic Party counterpart,23 
potentially explaining the disproportionate number of challenges to 
                                                          
employment discrimination based on sex); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (barring 
gender discrimination in education). 
 18. See, e.g., Ripon Soc’y, Inc. v. Nat’l Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (applying rational basis analysis, the most deferential level of analysis, to 
uphold party delegate selection formula). 
 19. See, e.g., Bachur v. Nat’l Democratic Party, 836 F.2d 837, 842-43 (4th Cir. 
1987) (upholding the Maryland Democratic Party’s Equal Division Rule and 
declaring that political parties’ private associational rights trump an individual’s 
freedom to vote). 
 20. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. IX, § 16 (adopting 
gender-balanced national, executive, and state committees, conventions, and 
commissions); REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.: ABOUT THE GOP, REPUBLICAN PARTY RULE 1 
(allocating National Committee membership to one man, one woman, and the state 
party chair), available at http://www.gop.com/About/default.aspx?Section=13 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2005); REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.: ABOUT THE GOP, REPUBLICAN PARTY 
RULE 5 (mandating gender-balance for National Committee Chair and Vice-Chair 
positions), available at http://www.gop.com/About/default.aspx?Section=13 (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
 21. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 69.16A (West 2004) (ordering gender-balanced 
state appointive boards, commissions, committees, and councils); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
2-15-108 (2003) (requiring “positive action” to attain gender-balanced state 
government boards, commissions, committees, and councils); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
21:33-a (2004) (listing gender-balance as one factor to consider in appointments to 
state offices, agencies, commissions, and boards); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-06-19 (2003) 
(recommending gender-balanced appointive boards, commissions, committees, and 
councils). 
 22. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 489 (Wash. 1978) (noting that state 
laws mandating gender-balanced state committee leadership originated in 1927 and 
1939). 
 23. Compare REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM.: ABOUT THE GOP, REPUBLICAN PARTY RULE 
14(D) (“Each state shall endeavor to have equal representation of men and women in 
its delegation to the Republican National Convention.”) (emphasis added), available 
at http://www.gop.com/About/default.aspx?Section=32 (last visited Feb. 24, 2005), 
with DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. II, § 4 (“The National 
Convention shall be composed of delegates equally divided between men and 
women.”) (emphasis added). 
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the latter.24  Nevertheless, the Republican Party’s activism in the post-
suffrage era galvanized Democratic Party members and contributed to 
the latter’s eventual adoption of the Equal Division Rule.25 
B. Pre-Suffrage: 1895-1919 
Equal division or “fifty-fifty” rules first appeared in political parties 
in Colorado a full quarter-century before American women attained 
full suffrage.26  In 1895, two years after Colorado women received 
voting rights, the Colorado Populist Party required gender-balanced 
committees, as did the Democratic Party for its county and state 
central committees.27  The Colorado Democratic and Republican 
Parties enacted gender-balance rules for party committees in 1906.28  
In 1910, the state legislature included gender-balanced party 
committees in the new primary law.29  Several other states, including 
Idaho, Michigan, and Nebraska, quickly followed suit.30 
As the prospect of women’s suffrage became imminent, both major 
national political parties expressed an interest in equal division 
rules.31  A 1919 Republican Party proposal for a gender-balanced 
                                                          
 24. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842-43 (affirming the validity of the Democratic 
Party’s Equal Division Rule); Ricard v. State, 544 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. Ct. App. 
1989) (upholding the Democratic Party’s Equal Division Rule); Levine v. Millspaugh, 
180 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. 1958) (permitting the Democratic State Committee’s 
rules requiring gender-balanced state committees).  But see In re Cavallier, 287 N.Y.S. 
739, 742 (N.Y. 1936) (rejecting the Democratic Party’s requirement of gender-
balanced state committees).  Although this Comment focuses primarily on the 
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule due to the large number of relevant cases, 
conclusions apply to both political parties. 
 25. See generally Richard E. Matland & Donley T. Studlar, The Contagion of 
Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation 
Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway, 58 J. POL. 707 (1996) (proposing a “contagion 
theory,” whereby a party’s adoption of gender quotas caused competing parties to 
adopt similar measures to increase women’s representation). 
 26. See JO FREEMAN, A ROOM AT A TIME: HOW WOMEN ENTERED PARTY POLITICS 110-
11 (2000) (noting that the 1894 predecessor to the Colorado Equal Division Rule 
called for at least one woman to sit on precinct committees).  However, many county 
committees refused to follow this rule.  Id. 
 27. See id. (revealing the Populist Party’s trendsetting actions). 
 28. But see id. (observing that gender-balance rules did not always translate to 
equal representation). 
 29. See id. at 111 (arguing that Colorado women’s organization and activism, 
particularly in small towns across the state, enabled them to take their demand of 
equal representation on party committees to the state legislature). 
 30. See id. (observing that the two main Idaho political parties brought equally 
divided central committees to the 1898 state party convention, Michigan mandated 
two men and one woman on Congressional party committees, and Nebraska required 
gender-balanced district representation). 
 31. See KRISTI ANDERSEN, AFTER SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN PARTISAN AND ELECTORAL 
POLITICS BEFORE THE NEW DEAL 81-105 (1996) (examining the state and national 
parties’ adoption, advocacy, and enforcement of “fifty-fifty” rules). 
5
Schnall: Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Division Ru
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
386 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:2 
National Committee failed;32 however, the Party agreed to increase 
the number of seats on the Executive Committee from ten to fifteen, 
and to recommend reserving seven of the seats for female Committee 
members.33  The Democratic Party, on the other hand, successfully 
adopted a proposal to double the Democratic National Committee, 
thereafter including one male and one female member per state.34  
Democrats, in particular, viewed women as a political resource and 
potential electoral goldmine.35  Both parties publicized their 
respective gender-related policies to attract women’s votes.36 
C. Post-Suffrage: 1920-1950 
The Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, granted women full 
voting rights.37  Political parties subsequently began wooing women in 
earnest, seeking to double their constituencies.38  “Fifty-fifty” rules 
represented one strategy parties employed to attract female voters at 
both the national and state levels.39  The Republican Party became 
the political trendsetter for equal division rules during the era.40  In 
                                                          
 32. See id. at 81 (noting that the Rules Committee denied the request, despite 
the fact that Republican women proposed “adequate” instead of “equal” 
representation). 
 33. See id. at 81-82 (revealing that female Republican Party elites acquiesced to 
this arrangement both to prevent the Democratic Party from using the issue for 
political gain and to prove their leadership efficacy to male Republican Party elite). 
 34. See Committee Votes for Full Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1920, at 2 
(explaining the logistics of the decision, according to which male delegates initially 
elected female delegates, and thereafter, voters chose female delegates). 
 35. But see ANDERSEN, supra note 31, at 82 (asserting that in 1920, the Republican 
Party sought to capitalize on women’s votes). 
 36. See App. WOMAN CITIZEN, Sept. 11, 1920, at 399 (lauding the gender-balanced 
Democratic National Committee and highlighting the dearth of a similar rule in the 
Republican Party); WOMAN CITIZEN, Oct. 9, 1920, at 513 (distinguishing the 
Republican Party National Executive Committee as the “REAL COMMITTEE of real 
power” from the comparatively powerless Democratic National Committee). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The rights of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of sex.”).  See generally VOTES FOR WOMEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR SUFFRAGE REVISITED 
(Jean H. Baker ed., 2002) (depicting the achievement of women’s suffrage as “the 
story of nation-building and citizen-making”). 
 38. See ANNA L. HARVEY, VOTES WITHOUT LEVERAGE: WOMEN IN AMERICAN 
ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1920-1970 111-35 (1998) (detailing the Democratic and 
Republican Parties’ efforts to attract female votes by establishing women’s party 
organizations and emphasizing issues related to women’s domestic and maternal 
duties). 
 39. But see CHRISTINA WOLBRECHT, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PARTIES, 
POSITIONS, AND CHANGE 26-27 (2000) (acknowledging the parties’ lax enforcement of 
such rules given the small minority of women in party delegations and male 
dominance in appointments to leadership positions, even within the parties’ women’s 
organizations). 
 40. See ANDERSEN, supra note 31, at 105 (revealing that equal division rules 
disproportionately benefited women with “traditional policy concerns” who were 
likely to belong to the Republican Party). 
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1924, the Republican Party adopted Rule 14, which permitted states 
to send one man and one woman to the National Committee.41  
Throughout the 1920s, the Republican Party, bolstered by its majority 
presence in many state legislatures, lobbied for the passage of “fifty-
fifty” statutes.42  The Party’s efforts proved successful; in 1929, 
eighteen states possessed “fifty-fifty” rules at various levels in both 
major political parties.43 
In the 1930s, the Democratic Party took a more active role in the 
fight for equal division at the behest of Molly Dewson, the head of the 
Democratic National Committee’s Women’s Division.44  Dewson 
perceived gender-balance requirements as the most effective 
mechanism to increase women’s participation and leadership in 
political parties.45  Her tactical decision to frame the issue as 
providing women with opportunities, rather than limiting those of 
men, and to emphasize women’s maternal responsibilities as the 
justification for women’s inclusion rendered her efforts largely 
successful.46  Women’s enhanced electoral power as the majority of 
registered voters further spurred the drive for gender-balance party 
rules.47  By 1950, only eight states lacked equal division laws or party 
rules.48 
Despite the prevalence of equal division rules, female party 
members soon realized that such provisions provided for physical 
                                                          
 41. See FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 112 (noting the rule’s demise in 1952). 
 42. See id. at 110-11, 115 (noting the increasing popularity of equal division laws 
after Colorado’s legislative and party actions). 
 43. But see Emily Newell Blair, Women in the Political Parties, 143 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 223 (1929) (acknowledging that at least “some” women 
became active in party organizations in states without “fifty-fifty” rules). 
 44. See infra App. for a political cartoon printed in DEMOCRATIC DIG., June 1935, 
reprinted in Jacqueline R. Braitman, Legislated Parity: Mandating Integration of 
Women into California Political Parties, 1930s-1950s, in WE HAVE COME TO STAY: 
AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTIES, 1880-1960, at 174, 174 (Melanie Gustafson 
et al. eds., 1999) (depicting Molly Dewson’s efforts to enhance women’s political 
participation and representation). 
 45. See FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 116 (revealing that Dewson, as head of the 
Women’s Division, drafted model “fifty-fifty” statutes for state party adoption). 
 46. See id. at 117 (attributing Dewson’s effective advocacy of “fifty-fifty” rules to 
her public acceptance of “male predominance”). 
 47. See Marguerite J. Fisher, Women in the Political Parties, 251 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 93 (1947) (noting that male party elites accorded women 
influential positions, such as Republican Party National Committee Assistant Chair 
and Democratic Party National Committee Secretary, to win women’s votes). 
 48. See Braitman, supra note 44, at 180 (explaining women’s political advances 
after World War I, as women’s war-time employment prepared them to pursue 
political posts).  The eight states in which parties failed to pursue “fifty-fifty” laws or 
party rules were Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  Id. at 178, 180. 
7
Schnall: Party Parity: A Defense of the Democratic Party Equal Division Ru
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
388 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:2 
representation, but not effective authority.49  In fact, regardless of 
their designation as “fifty-fifty” rules, the laws did not guarantee equal 
representation.50  Quantitatively and qualitatively, female party 
members remained second class citizens.51 
D. Women’s Movement: 1960s-1970s 
The advent of the second wave of the women’s movement in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s highlighted women’s social, economic, and 
political inequality.52  Both major political parties undertook reform 
measures intended to redress women’s lackluster participation rates.53  
The Democratic Commission on Delegate Selection and Party 
Reform, also known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, mandated 
state party action to remedy past sex discrimination and to achieve 
“reasonable representation” of women as national convention 
delegates.54  The reforms initially proved successful: at the 1972 
national convention, women accounted for approximately forty 
                                                          
 49. See ELISABETH ISRAELS PERRY, BELLE MOSKOWITZ: FEMININE POLITICS AND THE 
EXERCISE OF POWER IN THE AGE OF ALFRED E. SMITH 195 (1987) (revealing that male 
Democratic Party National Committee members selected female vice chairs without 
first seeking advice from female committee members); Eunice Fuller Barnard, The 
Woman Voter Gains Power, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 12, 1928, at 1-2, 20 (describing the 
Republican National Committeewomen’s exclusion from a strategy meeting attended 
by their male colleagues). 
 50. See Anna L. Harvey, Culture or Strategy?  Women in New York State Parties, 
1917-1930, in WE HAVE COME TO STAY: AMERICAN WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTIES, 1880-
1960 87, 92-94 (Melanie Gustafson et al. eds., 1999) (noting male party leaders’ 
refusal to acknowledge or abide by equal division rules for Republican State and 
Democratic National Committees). 
 51. But see Braitman, supra note 44, at 179 (contending that party rosters 
identified women by their own names, rather than by their marital names, and that 
women acted independently and not as pawns of male relatives or acquaintances). 
 52. See generally THE FEMINIST MEMOIR PROJECT: VOICES FROM WOMEN’S 
LIBERATION (Rachel Blau DuPlessis & Ann Snitow eds., 1998) (addressing the 
experiences, aspirations, and achievements of feminist activists during the 1960s and 
1970s). 
 53. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 34-35 (reviewing disputes between 
moderate and conservative Republicans concerning the necessity of including women 
in the Party’s affirmative action efforts); Bella Abzug et al., Women in the Democratic 
Party: A Review of Affirmative Action, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 3, 11-12 (1974) 
(discussing the Mikulski Commission’s strategies to attract female members with 
financial and educational assistance and targeted recruitment). 
 54. See JANET A. FLAMMANG, WOMEN’S POLITICAL VOICE: HOW WOMEN ARE 
TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE AND STUDY OF POLITICS 136 (1997) (revealing that 
Democratic and Republican delegates perceived gender discrimination as a 
significant obstacle to women’s participation as party members, leaders, and 
candidates); DENIS G. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION: THE 
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION 1972, at 17 (1974) (summarizing the McGovern-Fraser 
Commission reforms, which sought to enhance the participation of African-
Americans, youths, and women).  But see Jeane Kirkpatrick, Representation in the 
American National Conventions: The Case of 1972, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 265, 275-77 
(1975) (criticizing the McGovern-Fraser Commission as emphasizing diversity of 
delegates rather than diversity of perspectives). 
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percent of the Democratic delegation.55 
The Republican Party, as well, relied on Commission investigations 
and reports to formulate a party policy regarding women’s 
participation at national conventions.56  The Republican Committee 
on Delegations and Organizations issued a report in 1971, which the 
Rules Committee later adopted, recommending states “endeavor” to 
present gender-balanced delegations at the 1972 convention.57  The 
proposal to include sex in Rule 32, which addressed the Party’s 
commitment to use “positive action to achieve the broadest possible 
participation”58 of various underrepresented groups, proved much 
more contentious.59  Although the moderate party members 
prevailed and oversaw the addition of sex to the rule, the lack of 
enforcement provisions weakened its overall effectiveness.60  Despite 
the Party’s resistance to commit to sex-based affirmative action 
measures, women accounted for almost thirty percent of the delegates 
at the 1972 Republican convention, almost twice the proportion 
present at the previous national convention.61 
The 1976 national conventions sparked continued debate 
regarding women and affirmative action.62  Feminist and African-
American Democratic caucus members lobbied for an equal division 
rule for state delegations after observing a decrease in the selection of 
                                                          
 55. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 36 (comparing the 1972 convention to the 
1968 convention, in which thirteen percent of the delegates were women).  But see 
Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 12 (asserting that the Democratic delegation at the 
1972 national convention was forty-nine percent female). 
 56. See Jo Freeman, Whom You Know Versus Whom You Represent: Feminist 
Influence in the Democratic and Republican Parties, in THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 215, 223 (Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Carol 
McClurg Mueller eds., 1987) (noting that Rosemary Ginn, the chair of the 
Republican Committee on Delegates and Organizations, supported the National 
Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC)).  The NWPC championed “fifty-fifty” rules for 
delegates.  Id. at 222-23. 
 57. See id. (observing that the Republican Party National Committee declined to 
specify what actions would satisfy this recommendation, instead permitting the 
exercise of state party discretion). 
 58. TANYA MELICH, THE REPUBLICAN WAR AGAINST WOMEN: AN INSIDER’S REPORT 
FROM BEHIND THE LINES 25-26 (1996). 
 59. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 34-44 (acknowledging the dispute as one of 
many between moderate and conservative party members); MELICH, supra note 58, at 
26 (noting that Rule 32 encompassed women, youth, minority and “heritage” groups, 
and senior citizens). 
 60. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 38 (contrasting the Republican regulation 
with similar Democratic measures permitting delegates to hold the party accountable 
for inadequate gender representation). 
 61. See PAUL ALLEN BECK & FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 286 (7th 
ed. 1992) (categorizing the percentage of female delegates at party conventions 
between 1968 and 1988). 
 62. See Freeman, supra note 56, at 228 (noting that Democratic feminists focused 
on achieving a “fifty-fifty” rule at the 1976 convention). 
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female delegates when compared with the previous delegation.63  
Then-Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter’s opposition to fifty-fifty 
rules for delegates in 1976 prevented their establishment; however, 
Carter mollified feminist activists by promising to endorse equal 
division in the future and to increase the opportunities for women in 
the Democratic Party, his presidential campaign, and his 
administration.64 
Unlike their Democratic counterparts, whose advocacy of equal 
division in 1976 conclusively demonstrated their influence within the 
Party,65 Republican feminists seeking greater participation of women 
received rebukes for attempting to “McGovernize” the party by 
requiring gender quotas.66  Nevertheless, the proportion of female 
Republican delegates increased slightly to thirty-six percent, while that 
of female Democratic delegates decreased to thirty-four percent.67 
In 1978, in time for the mid-term convention, the Democratic Party 
established the Equal Division Rule, mandating gender-balanced 
delegations at national conventions.68  Continued feminist advocacy 
and the death of AFL-CIO President George Meaney, an outspoken 
quota foe, contributed to the party’s adoption of the “fifty-fifty” rule, 
almost sixty years after the Democratic National Committee first 
considered the proposal.69  The rule remains in effect today.70 
                                                          
 63. See id. (asserting that midway through the process, election of African-
American, Hispanic, young, and female delegates in 1976 lagged fifteen to thirty-five 
percent behind the 1972 count). 
 64. See Mary L. Clark, Changing the Face of the Law: How Women’s Advocacy 
Groups Put Women on the Federal Judicial Appointments Agenda, 14 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 243, 243-52 (2002) (revealing President Carter’s precedent-setting 
appointment of women to the federal judiciary).  During his four years in office, 
President Carter appointed forty women to federal courts, five times as many as all 
prior presidential appointments.  Id. at 245. 
 65. See Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican 
Parties, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 327, 341 (1986) (arguing that Democratic feminist leaders 
lost the equal division battle but ultimately won the war by proving their efficacy, 
organization, and determination). 
 66. See WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 41 (observing that female Party members’ 
protests at the convention resulted in the weakening of the Republican rule 
prohibiting discriminatory delegate selection). 
 67. See Freeman, supra note 56, at 228 (contending that the decrease in female 
delegates from 1972 to 1976 renewed support for the “50-50 rule,” which the 
Democratic Party adopted in 1978). 
 68. See id. at 229 (noting that around the time the Equal Division Rule passed, 
women accounted for more than half of the Democratic electorate). 
 69. See id. (observing that Carter’s staffers yielded the fight upon relentless 
feminist activism). 
 70. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. II, § 4 (requiring 
gender-balanced state delegations at national conventions). 
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II. DOCTRINAL CHALLENGES TO THE EQUAL DIVISION RULE 
A. Freedom of Association 
Political parties enjoy broad First Amendment protections, 
including freedoms of speech and association.71  This freedom of 
association encompasses a person’s right to associate with a party,72 a 
party’s right to determine standards for membership,73 and the party 
and members’ right to choose candidates to represent the party.74  
Courts generally respect parties’ autonomy and do not require parties 
to treat all voters and party members equally.75 
Nevertheless, prospective Democratic Party delegates could allege 
that the Equal Division Rule infringes upon their ability to “peaceably 
. . . assemble” at conventions by arbitrarily restricting their attendance 
as delegates at the convention.76  However, such freedom of 
association challenges of the Equal Division Rule will likely prove 
fruitless.77  Courts generally interpret freedom of association 
allegations broadly, assessing the impact of the rule at issue on the 
organization’s ability to further its overall mission.78  Just as courts 
have held that the admission of women members will not 
detrimentally affect, but in fact, may enhance private service 
organizations’ goals,79 so too will enforcing parity among male and 
                                                          
 71. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (linking the right to unite 
to promote political ideas with the freedom to associate with a preferred political 
party). 
 72. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (proclaiming the freedom to 
assemble and endorse political views as one of “our most precious freedoms”). 
 73. See Democratic Party v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) 
(deducing freedom to limit party membership as inherent in parties’ freedom to 
associate). 
 74. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 601 n.9 (Tamm, J., concurring) (explaining that 
although delegates select the nominee, ballot inclusion occurs only after state party 
certification). 
 75. See id. at 583-84 (noting that parties restrict voters’ ability to select delegates 
to various conventions and grant automatic delegate status to certain party officials). 
 76. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble . . . .”). 
 77. See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 
224 (1989) (asserting that the First Amendment protects political parties’ processes 
for selecting party leaders). 
 78. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) 
(holding that requiring California Rotary Clubs to accept women members fails to 
infringe on the Club’s right of association or to impact the Club’s public service 
goals); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (noting that 
admission of women as members fails to prevent the Jaycees from achieving their 
political and social objectives). 
 79. See Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 548-49 (positing that the Rotary Club’s admission 
of female members will enhance the organization’s community service capabilities). 
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female delegates further the Democratic Party’s objectives.80  In 
Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, the Court 
required Rotary Clubs to admit women members, observing that 
expanding the membership base would strengthen the organization’s 
productivity.81  Similarly, requiring gender-balanced delegations at 
national conventions advances Democratic Party goals of equality, 
justice, and democracy by providing male and female party members 
the ability to directly participate in the political process.82  As long as 
courts continue to grant parties expansive associational rights, 
freedom of association challenges of party procedures stand little 
chance of success. 
B. Voting Rights 
Democratic Party members have challenged the Equal Division 
Rule as an infringement of their voting rights.83  Courts acknowledge 
the right to vote as a fundamental right reflective of the liberties 
enjoyed in a democratic nation.84  This right extends to primary 
elections.85  The significance of the right to freely cast one’s ballot has 
led courts to apply strict scrutiny to alleged state interference with 
electoral processes; thus, courts frequently strike down statutes as 
encroaching upon political party liberties.86  As the Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed, the extension of First Amendment protections to 
political parties largely insulates them from state regulation.87  Unlike 
                                                          
 80. See Marchioro, 582 P.2d at 494 (concluding that equal division of party 
leadership positions does not substantially burden party members’ abilities to pursue 
party goals). 
 81. Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 549 (noting that admitting female members would 
provide Rotary Clubs with “a more representative cross section of community leaders 
with a broadened capacity for service”). 
 82. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. IX, § 17 (outlining the 
Democratic Party Credo); see also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975) 
(asserting that convention delegates perform a “task of supreme importance” in 
selecting the parties’ Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates). 
 83. See, e.g., Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 666 F. Supp. 763, 769 (Md. 1987) 
(arguing that the Equal Division Rule violated Bachur’s right to vote for delegates to 
the national convention), rev’d, Bachur v. Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th 
Cir. 1987). 
 84. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (heralding the right to vote as 
“the essence of a democratic society”); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 
(1886) (lauding the right to vote as “preservative of all rights”). 
 85. See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941) (identifying primary 
elections as essential to the electoral process of electing members of Congress). 
 86. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) 
(using strict scrutiny analysis to reject Connecticut’s closed primary statute as beyond 
the state’s delegated authority to control the “times, places, and manner” of 
elections). 
 87. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 575 (2000) (commending 
political parties’ “special” First Amendment protections regarding member selection 
of nominees). 
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state statutes, party regulations receive the most deferential judicial 
analysis.88  Therefore, party actions may trump the right to vote, 
which, although fundamental, is not absolute.89 
Thus, participants in the delegate selection process possess 
restricted voting rights.90  The Supreme Court has failed to 
definitively apply the one person, one vote standard to national 
nominating conventions.91  Furthermore, while no circuit courts have 
ruled affirmatively in the matter, two appellate courts have explicitly 
rejected such claims.92  In Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican 
Party, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the one person, one vote 
standard failed to uniformly apply to all elections,93 and noted that 
such a rule contradicted the less-than-democratic governing style of 
political parties.94  In Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, the 
Eighth Circuit, reiterating judicial reluctance to interfere with 
internal party matters, refrained from applying the one person, one 
vote standard to district, county, and state party conventions.95 
Even if a court concluded that equal division rules infringed upon 
electors’ voting rights, the court could still find such limitations 
permissible.96  As the Fourth Circuit acknowledged in Bachur v. 
                                                          
 88. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (approving, under rational basis analysis, 
the Democratic Party’s use of gender-balanced delegations to enhance women’s 
participation in national conventions); Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 586-87 (upholding, 
based on rational basis analysis, the Republican Party’s delegate selection procedure, 
which awarded “victory bonuses” to states based on their electoral results). 
 89. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 580 (cautioning against blind reliance on the 
“one person, one vote” standard and asserting that constitutional guarantees of 
representation hinge on the governmental entity at issue). 
 90. See Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1088 n.40-41 
(11th Cir. 1983) (articulating the limited scope of the one person, one vote standard, 
which is inapplicable in state judicial elections, “special purpose assemblies,” state 
constitutional conventions, and, in certain circumstances, party nominating 
conventions). 
 91. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483 n.4 (declining to broaden the scope of inquiry 
beyond the determination of whether state law or party rules establish delegate 
qualification for participation in the national convention). 
 92. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 578-87 (holding that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires only that the representational system further 
a legitimate party interest); see also Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 
119, 119-21 (8th Cir. 1968) (refusing to strike a party rule allowing selection of 
national convention delegates from malapportioned districts). 
 93. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 579-80 (observing the inapplicability of the one 
person, one vote standard to state judiciary elections and various special assemblies). 
 94. See id. at 580-85 (recognizing the inherent inequity of various party 
institutions, including the electoral college, the National Committee, and party 
caucuses and conventions). 
 95. See Irish, 399 F.2d at 120 (limiting judicial examination of the one person, 
one vote standard to precinct level elections). 
 96. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841-42 (distinguishing voting for delegates from 
voting for candidates and noting that parties may restrict an elector’s participation or 
discontinue the use of primaries altogether). 
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Democratic National Party, parties retain the right to determine 
delegate selection methods and to implement party rules that dilute 
electors’ votes.97 
The judiciary’s relative leniency towards political parties,98 
combined with parties’ ability to dictate delegate selection 
procedure,99 indicate that equal division rules do not infringe upon 
party members’ voting rights.100  Such rules constitute internal party 
decisions judicially recognized as within the scope of party 
authority.101  Generally, as long as parties ensure that elections are 
conducted in a fair, impartial manner, they will fulfill their obligation 
to rationally promote legitimate party goals.102 
The establishment and implementation of gender-balanced 
delegations fails to detrimentally affect the integrity of delegate 
elections.103  Ballots list delegate candidates by sex, and instruct voters 
to select equal numbers of male and female delegates.104  States enjoy 
the discretion to determine how to treat ballots that fail to conform to 
the Equal Division Rule requirements.105  To ensure party members’ 
                                                          
 97. See id. at 842 (explaining that many states employ means other than 
primaries to select convention delegates, and that electors’ and delegates’ votes do 
not unilaterally control the selection of the party’s presidential candidate). 
 98. Compare Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 586-87 (holding that parties’ delegate 
selection formulas must merely “rationally advance” a “legitimate” party objective to 
withstand judicial scrutiny), with Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 225 (using heightened scrutiny 
to strike a Connecticut statute requiring registered party members to choose 
delegates in primary elections). 
 99. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (employing the rational basis standard to uphold 
Maryland’s Equal Division Rule, despite its encroachment on an individual’s right to 
vote for the delegate of his choice).  The court held that the Rule’s representational 
scheme rationally advanced the legitimate state interest in “stimulat[ing] greater 
female participation” within the Democratic Party.  Id. 
 100. See id. at 841-42 (reasoning that no infringement exists because the right to 
vote for a delegate is far removed from the fundamental right to vote in elections for 
candidates for public office). 
 101. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229, 231 (accepting parties’ rights to determine electoral 
procedures and candidate selection while acknowledging that states may intervene to 
protect electoral fairness).  But see Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 
(1974) (holding that states may mandate party primaries); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 
U.S. 752, 760-62 (1973) (permitting states to require party registration before 
primaries to discourage party raiding, whereby non-party members register to 
influence primary results); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) (concluding 
that states may restrict candidate participation to those with “a significant modicum of 
support”). 
 102. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 588 (upholding a Republican Party formula 
providing “victory bonuses” based on state party electoral performance as properly 
furthering the Party’s goal of political success). 
 103. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 231 (permitting state involvement in internal party 
matters only when necessary to ensure the integrity of the electoral system). 
 104. See Paul W. Valentine, Maryland Democrats Lose in Court; Sex-Based 
Delegate Selection Struck Down, WASH. POST, July 30, 1987, at D1 (explaining the 
Equal Division Rule ballot procedure). 
 105. Telephone Interview with Alicia Kolar Prevost, Deputy Director, Party Affairs 
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voting rights, parties could collect all ballots, tabulate results, and 
then award the top female and male vote selections the delegate 
positions.106  This option, however, provides little incentive for voters 
to comply with the Equal Division Rule; those who either innocently 
or deliberately ignore the Rule may not be penalized.  The Equal 
Division Rule and its objectives, then, are rendered toothless.107  A 
more stringent alternative might involve parties’ discarding ballots 
that fail to comply with the Equal Division Rule.108 
It is unlikely that a disgruntled voter could successfully challenge 
the Democratic Party’s decision to disregard ballots that do not act in 
accord with Equal Division Rule requirements.  Courts apply a 
deferential test to a party’s allocation formula, generally guaranteeing 
the validity of the policy.109  To withstand scrutiny, parties need only 
provide “legitimate justifications” for formulas that produce 
“substantial deviations from equality of voting power.”110  All voters 
who comply with the ballot instructions enjoy the right to vote and 
have their votes tabulated.111  If a court found that the Democratic 
Party’s disregard of ballots that failed to comply with the Equal 
Division Rule constituted a substantial deviation from equal voting 
power,112 the court should still conclude that the Party proffered a 
legitimate justification for the Rule.113  The Democratic Party’s history 
of gender-based discrimination, coupled with previous fruitless 
                                                          
and Delegate Selection, Democratic National Committee (Oct. 14, 2003); see, e.g., 
Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 769 (explaining that Maryland’s ballot requirements prohibit 
tabulating ballots that fail to comply with the Equal Division Rule), rev’d, Bachur v. 
Democratic Nat’l Party, 836 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 106. See Levine, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 470-71 (upholding the election of a female 
candidate receiving three votes).  Though two male candidates received 427 and 423 
votes respectively, party rules required one male and one female committee member.  
Id. 
 107. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 23 (describing the objectives of affirmative 
action as enhancing women’s participation and representation within all levels of the 
party). 
 108. See, e.g., Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 769 (observing that in Maryland, ballots that 
do not conform with the Equal Division Rule are disregarded). 
 109. Compare Georgia v. Nat’l Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (upholding parties’ allocation policies using rational basis analysis), with La 
Follette, 450 U.S. at 126 (employing heightened scrutiny to reject Wisconsin’s 
delegate selection method, which violated Democratic Party rules). 
 110. See Georgia, 447 F.2d at 1279 (upholding party formulas that did not provide 
equal state delegations at conventions based on differing levels of state party 
constituencies). 
 111. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (equating the right to cast a 
ballot with the right to have one’s vote counted in both Congressional and 
preliminary elections). 
 112. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 769 (stating that the party would not count ballots 
not in compliance with the Equal Division Rule). 
 113. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (concluding that the Equal Division Rule 
“manifestly” satisfies rational basis analysis). 
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attempts to remedy the problem,114 validate the enactment of the 
Equal Division Rule.115 
In general, judicial resolution of freedom of association and voting 
rights challenges to the Equal Division Rule reveals the superiority of 
political parties’ rights over those of individual members.116  
Furthermore, parties’ interests in controlling the selection of 
representatives outranks states’ interests in ensuring the integrity of 
the electoral process.117  Thus, parties enjoy relative immunity from 
intense judicial scrutiny when they use certain mechanisms to 
determine candidate selection.118 
C. Political Question Doctrine 
Parties’ delegate selection methods arguably constitute non-
justiciable political questions.119  Generally, courts will refrain from 
intervening in cases challenging party convention actions regarding 
delegates unless the convention decision appears capricious, unfair, 
or deceitful.120  Courts have further restricted this rule by reasoning 
that conventions are best suited to assess the qualifications of 
potential delegations.121  In formulating the Equal Division Rule, the 
Democratic Party sought to remedy more than fifty years of party 
discrimination against women.122  Despite previous party attempts to 
                                                          
 114. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 4-5 (explaining the Party’s general 
reluctance to assist female candidates); see also FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 110-12 
(acknowledging that male party elites granted female members committee positions, 
but not effective power to influence party decisions); Kirkpatrick, supra note 54, at 
278 (speculating that women’s under-representation among party elite resulted not 
only from party discrimination, but also from societal discrimination). 
 115. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (upholding the Equal Division Rule as rationally 
related to achievement of the Party’s legitimate interest in electoral success and 
constituency expansion). 
 116. See, e.g., Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Cent. Comm. v. Holm, 33 N.W.2d 
831, 836-37 (Minn. 1948) (concluding that the legislature ceded control of 
conventions to political parties, which exercise discretion in seating delegates). 
 117. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 549 (elevating the "vital" national interest of selecting 
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates accomplished at national party 
conventions over state interests in unilaterally determining delegate selection 
procedure). 
 118. See, e.g., Eu, 489 U.S. at 230 (acknowledging parties’ discretion regarding 
internal governance, structure, and activities).  But see Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 588 
(cautioning heightened analysis of parties’ use of invidious classifications). 
 119. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (describing factors that 
render an issue a political question, including constitutional designation to a political 
branch, unclear resolution criteria, or necessity of assistance from other branches of 
government). 
 120. See, e.g., Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 837 (refusing jurisdiction where the state 
statute granted the state central committee control over presidential electors). 
 121. See id. at 833-34 (classifying delegates’ rights as political rather than legal, and 
generally outside the realm of judicial scrutiny). 
 122. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 4-5 (summarizing the poor treatment of 
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increase women’s intra-party stature,123 party leaders remained 
predominantly male.124  The Rule passed only after contentious 
debates, feminist activism, and the favorable recommendation of the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission.125  Under such circumstances, courts 
could not reasonably conclude that the Equal Division Rule reflected 
capricious, unfair, or deceitful conduct.126 
Could a claim alleging that the Equal Division Rule represented 
gender-based political gerrymandering succeed? Courts generally 
accept group complaints about voting rights based on racial and 
political gerrymandering.127  In Davis v. Bandemer, Indiana 
Democrats charged that a legislative reapportionment plan proposed 
and passed by the Republican-dominated state legislature represented 
political gerrymandering and infringed upon the Democrats’ Equal 
Protection rights.128  In the first election held pursuant to the 
redistricting plan, the proportion of Democrats elected to office did 
not reflect—and was significantly less than, in some cases—the 
proportion of votes cast for Democratic candidates.129  While finding 
political gerrymandering claims, like racial claims, justiciable under 
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court cautioned that to have merit, 
complaints must demonstrate that the structure of the electoral 
                                                          
women by party leaders, who relegated female candidates to hopeless races and 
provided female candidates with less financial and organizational assistance than their 
male counterparts). 
 123. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (acknowledging the party’s failure to enhance 
women’s participation prior to enactment of the Equal Division Rule); WOLBRECHT, 
supra note 39, at 27 (revealing that early gender-balance rules accorded women little 
effective authority). 
 124. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 5 (denouncing the “virtual absence” of 
women from Democratic leadership positions in 1968).  Only one of the fifty-five state 
and territorial parties, Oregon, possessed a female chairperson.  Id.  See also David 
Niven, Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57, 
61 (1998) (observing the prevalence of male party elites, who account for ninety-
seven percent of party leaders in certain states). 
 125. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 17 (explaining the McGovern-Fraser 
reforms, which required a “reasonable relationship” between the proportion of 
African-Americans, women, and youth in the state population and the state party 
delegation); WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 42 (describing feminist and minorities’ 
advocacy of “fifty-fifty” rules). 
 126. See Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 834 (ruling that judicial intervention will result only 
where conventions act “arbitrarily, oppressively, or fraudulently” in the candidate 
selection process). 
 127. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986) (affirming the 
justiciability of cases brought pursuant to the equal protection clause that involve the 
placement of district boundaries in a manner designed to affect racial or political 
groups). 
 128. See id. at 113-15 (discussing Indiana’s legislative structure and the House and 
Senate reapportionment plans). 
 129. See id. at 115 (noting that Democratic House candidates won 51.9% of the 
vote, but only 43% of the seats, and that in two counties, Democratic House 
candidates received 46.6% of the vote, but only 14% of the seats). 
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system repeatedly restricts voters’ abilities to influence the political 
process.130 
Whereas racial and political gerrymandering plans affect all voters 
in the relevant districts, the Equal Division Rule affects only those 
individuals who voluntarily decide to affiliate with the Democratic 
Party for the purpose of participating in primary elections.131  
Furthermore, racial and political gerrymandering claims arise in the 
context of direct election of candidates, while the Equal Division Rule 
encompasses only the delegate—and not the candidate—selection 
process, a process in which courts have traditionally proven reluctant 
to intrude.132 
Given that the Equal Division Rule represents an internal rule 
applicable only to party affiliates voluntarily participating in primary 
elections, courts should hold challenges non-justiciable.  In 
Democratic-Farmer-Labor State Central Committee v. Holm, the 
court emphasized the political nature of delegate selection 
determination, refusing to intervene in an internal party dispute 
involving competing groups of presidential electors.133  Similarly, in 
Wymbs v. Republican State Executive Committee, the Eleventh Circuit 
declined to determine the constitutionality of a local party’s 
convention delegate selection procedure.134  The court found that 
judicial involvement would necessitate improper policy decisions and 
would fail to properly settle the matter.135  Challenges to the Equal 
Division Rule implicate analogous issues of judicial encroachment in 
political realms.136  Political parties, rather than the judiciary, govern 
                                                          
 130. See id. at 132-33 (requiring “specific supporting evidence” from which the 
Court may infer impermissible vote dilution). 
 131. See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 56-57 (heralding the right to associate oneself with a 
political party as an essential constitutional liberty protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments). 
 132. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (mandating the 
presentation of evidence establishing the minority challenger’s restricted ability to 
elect legislators); Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841 (describing Bachur’s election of delegates 
as “some steps removed” from election of “actual candidates”). 
 133. See Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 834 (finding political conventions best situated to 
ascertain delegates’ qualifications and noting the undefined scope of judicial scrutiny 
in convention matters). 
 134. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1080, 1086 (concluding that Wymbs’s failure to sue 
the Republican Party National Committee, political parties’ broad associational rights, 
and the Court’s inability to enforce the proposed “one Republican, one vote” rule 
precluded judicial intervention). 
 135. See id. at 1083 n.28 (articulating permissible party policies as addressing party 
ideology, candidate nomination, and member recruitment, particularly of 
underrepresented groups such as minorities, women, and youth).  The court also 
noted the inability of injunctive relief to affect future conventions’ acceptance of 
improperly elected delegates.  Id. at 1085. 
 136. See id. at 1081, 1085 (stating factors relevant to justiciability determinations, 
including the necessity of non-judicial policy pronouncements and the availability of 
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in cases involving delegate selection disputes.137  A court’s perception 
of selection methods as illogical or unreasonable does not justify 
judicial intrusion into party domain.138  Suits questioning the validity 
of the Equal Division Rule would require courts to assess the 
suitability of internal party decisions to expand party membership and 
participation, blatantly infringing on the parties’ liberty to institute 
positive measures.139 
Furthermore, party decisions regarding the electoral processes for 
selecting candidates fail to include leeway for judicial intervention 
and conflict resolution.140  Determination of damages would prove 
difficult in an electoral context; had equal division rules not applied, 
participants might have selected partially or entirely different 
delegates.141  Ascertaining the type of damages that would sufficiently 
compensate the wronged party also would prove complicated.142  If 
courts award expectation damages, how should judges determine the 
value of attending a national nominating convention?143  Could a 
court adequately compensate individuals for the lost opportunities of 
participating in a political tradition, networking with fellow delegates, 
and influencing the party’s political platform?144 
In addition, judicial participation in delegate elections would 
require judicial intrusion into matters best left to the discretion of 
more politically knowledgeable groups.145  Political branches, rather 
than legal branches, determine a state’s electoral representation.146  
                                                          
established guidelines for adjudication). 
 137. See La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124 (asserting that parties’ overriding interest in 
deciding delegate disputes derives from parties’ freedom of association). 
 138. See id. at 124 n.27 (precluding both the state legislature and judiciary from 
formulating the rules that govern party members’ participation in the candidate 
nomination process). 
 139. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214 (describing party efforts to attract new members 
as “undeniably central” to their First Amendment liberties). 
 140. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (identifying political questions as those issues that 
lack guidelines for judicial solutions); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224 (reinforcing parties’ 
control over organizational structure and conduct). 
 141. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 840 (noting Bachur’s disinclination to reveal his 
preferred set of delegates). 
 142. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 774 (reserving judgment on whether Bachur’s 
request for one dollar in nominal damages effectively protected the suit upon failure 
of his request for injunctive and declaratory relief). 
 143. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489 (characterizing the delegates’ responsibility to 
select the Party’s presidential candidate as “a task of supreme importance”). 
 144. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 841-42 (acknowledging the importance of serving as a 
delegate, formulating party rules, adopting a party platform, and nominating a 
presidential candidate). 
 145. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (noting that non-judicial branches are best situated 
to make preliminary judgments and interpret political questions). 
 146. See, e.g., Smith v. McQueen, 166 So. 788, 791 (Ala. 1936) (asserting that party 
conventions determine party candidates). 
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Even a court that rejected the constitutionality of the Equal Division 
Rule conceded that internal party requirements of gender-balanced 
committees might survive judicial scrutiny for this reason.147 
The controversial Presidential elections in November 2000 and the 
ensuing political and legal turmoil fail to undermine this analysis.  
The implications of the contentious legal wrangling resulting from 
the 2000 elections remain unclear;148 in fact, both political parties 
geared up for similar battles before, during, and after the 2004 
Presidential elections.149  The current Supreme Court majority’s 
reverence for state’s rights and federalist principles, however, suggests 
the Court’s continued reluctance to intrude into the political 
process.150  Furthermore, any challenges to the Equal Division Rule 
would implicate non-justiciable internal party decisions, rather than 
justiciable state action.151 
D. State Action 
If, despite the previous analysis, a court finds an Equal Protection 
claim justiciable, it must then determine whether the claim involves 
state action.152  Constitutional rights such as freedom of association 
and equal protection limit only state actors and not private individuals 
or entities.153  If political parties are not state actors, then individuals 
may not bring constitutional challenges against them, thus precluding 
                                                          
 147. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 786 (distinguishing party decisions regarding 
delegate selection from party decisions concerning internal committees). 
 148. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (specifying that the Court’s 
reasoning was “limited to the present circumstances” due to the difficulties presented 
by the parties’ equal protection challenges to election laws). 
 149. See, e.g., Zachary Coile, Legal Battles Could Cloud Outcome in Swing States, 
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 23, 2004, at A1 (detailing the plethora of legal challenges to voting 
machines, provisional ballots, and voter registration processes in swing states and 
parties’ large-scale recruitment of lawyers to monitor voting procedures); Linda 
Kleindienst et al., Lawsuits Fly Before Voting Even Starts, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 
14, 2004, at A1 (“In Florida, presidential elections and lawsuits seem to go together 
like peanut butter and jelly.”). 
 150. See Gregory P. Magarian, How Bush Won, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 8, 2002, at 36 
(“[E]ven the rare sympathizers with the majority’s equal protection analysis . . . 
acknowledge that the analysis lacked precedential support and sharply violated the 
conservative judicial ethos of its five adherents.”).  See generally Timothy J. Conlan & 
Francosi Vergniolle De Chantal, The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American 
Federalism, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 253 (2001) (noting the expansion of state’s rights and 
concurrent restriction of Congressional authority under the current Supreme Court). 
 151. See discussion supra Part II.B (explaining judicial reluctance to intrude into 
internal party decisions regarding matters within the realm of party authority); see 
also discussion infra Part II.D (asserting the dearth of either state actors or state 
action in Equal Division Rule processes). 
 152. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1077 (highlighting courts’ reluctance to identify state 
action in political rights cases that do not involve racial discrimination). 
 153. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (noting the inapplicability of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to private acts, regardless of their discriminatory nature). 
20
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/4
2005]  DEFENSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY EQUAL DIVISION RULE 401 
the validity of Equal Protection suits targeting the Equal Division 
Rule.154 
Courts have established that primary elections constitute state 
action.155  In Smith v. Allwright, the Court held that party primaries 
represent state action because a state statute required parties to 
conduct electoral procedures, including primaries.156  In Terry v. 
Adams, the Court extended the scope of state action to encompass a 
private political association’s pre-primary elections because the 
association’s candidates almost invariably received the Democratic 
Party nomination.157  Subsequent appellate cases have reinforced the 
state action doctrine, concluding that party procedures represent state 
action when integrally related to the electoral process.158  Thus, 
courts consider political parties state actors when conducting 
elections, but view them as private organizations when performing 
internal party business.159 
Some courts have interpreted the Democratic Party’s 
implementation of the Equal Division Rule in primary elections as an 
internal party decision, rather than as state action.160  First, voting for 
delegates and voting for candidates represent vastly different acts; 
while delegates perform party duties such as rule establishment, 
platform deliberation, and candidate nomination, their candidate 
                                                          
 154. See Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Tex. 1997) 
(indicating the duality of political parties, which don and cast off state actor status 
depending on the nature of their conduct). 
 155. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding that a private 
political association’s primary election constituted state action); Smith v. Allwright, 
321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1944) (finding party primaries an essential component of the 
electoral process, and thus state action). 
 156. See Smith, 321 U.S. at 663-64 (emphasizing that the statutory requirements, 
not the party’s performance, rendered the party an agent of the state). 
 157. See Terry, 345 U.S. at 469 (dismissing the Democratic Party primary and 
election as merely “perfunctory ratifiers” of the Jaybird Democratic Association’s 
candidate selection). 
 158. See, e.g., Banchy v. Republican Party of Hamilton County, 898 F.2d 1192, 
1196 (6th Cir. 1990) (asserting that the election of a party ward chairman did not 
represent state action because there was no evidence that chairmen played an 
“integral part” in the political appointment process); Kay v. N.H. Democratic Party, 
821 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining that a presidential candidate’s forum is 
not an integral part of the electoral process and thus did not constitute state action); 
Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(invalidating a state statute requiring a weighted voting system for use in internal 
party affairs, but requiring equal voting where committee members performed public 
duties); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370, 372 (3d Cir. 1965) (upholding the voting 
system for electing party county chairmen). 
 159. See, e.g., Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 92-93 (distinguishing party platforms as beyond 
the electoral sphere and thus outside the realm of state action where state election 
laws did not mandate or regulate platforms). 
 160. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (interpreting the Equal Division Rule as an 
internal policy to expand women’s participation in party events). 
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preference may not become the party’s nominee.161  Alternatively, 
courts cannot validly consider delegate selection of a party’s nominee 
an “integral part of the electoral process” when the identity of the 
victor is a foregone conclusion long before the convention occurs.162 
In addition to selecting the party’s presidential nominee, national 
convention delegates also influence the rules, platform, and overall 
agenda of the party.163  Courts do not consider formation of the party 
platform a component of the election process.164  Party candidates 
may accept, reject, or completely disregard the party platform, with 
no repercussions.165  Delegates’ involvement with the party platform, 
an essential element of the delegates’ duties, thus fails to represent 
state action.166 
Examination of the key players involved in primary elections lends 
further credence to the assertion that courts should not view such 
events as state action.167  Courts have ruled that presidential electors, 
party committee members, national convention delegates, and state 
party chairs do not constitute state officers.168  Such individuals 
represent party, but not public, officials.169  In summary, interpreting 
primary elections as state action regardless of the fact that most, if not 
all, of the essential participants fail to constitute state actors and fail to 
                                                          
 161. See id. at 841-42 (suggesting that party policies may influence the nominee 
selection process). 
 162. See, e.g., Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93 (identifying state action when party policies 
or practices constituted “an integral part of the election process”); see also Joan 
Vennochi, Editorial, Hub Must Mend its Conventional Ways, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 
2002, at A19 (criticizing present-day conventions as “totally scripted, no-news-is-good-
news” affairs). 
 163. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1083 n.30 (describing delegates’ duties at national 
conventions). 
 164. See, e.g., Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93 (positing that the Texas Election Code does 
not mandate party platforms).  But see MELICH, supra note 58, at 22 (lauding 
platforms as blueprints of parties’ “promises and dreams” that “invariably” become 
the parties’ agendas). 
 165. See Dietz, 940 S.W.2d at 93 (linking a candidate’s independence regarding 
platform provisions with Texas’ failure to require or regulate party platforms). 
 166. See Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 601 (Tamm, J., concurring) (reasoning that the 
First Amendment protects government infringement of delegates’ duties of platform 
adoption, rule formulation, and nominee selection). 
 167. See, e.g., Smith v. State Exec. Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371, 373 (Ga. 1968) 
(finding that the state party chair does not constitute a state officer); Sears v. Sec’y of 
the Commw., 341 N.E.2d 264, 269 (Mass. 1975) (concluding that party members and 
national convention delegates do not represent state officers); Stanford v. Butler, 181 
S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. 1944) (holding that presidential electors are not state officers). 
 168. See id.  But see Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 574-76 (suggesting that a national 
party’s selection of convention delegates might constitute state action based on 
federal funding of national committees, conventions, and primary elections). 
 169. See, e.g., Morris v. Peters, 46 S.E.2d 729, 734 (Ga. 1948) (noting that statutory 
regulation of state party chair responsibilities does not indicate legislative intent to 
render the chairman a state actor). 
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perform solely state functions is illogical and erroneous.170 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
Since Craig v. Boren,171 courts have examined gender 
discrimination claims by applying intermediate scrutiny analysis.172  
To survive such scrutiny, gender-based classifications must be 
“substantially related” to the achievement of “important governmental 
objectives.”173  The Supreme Court later amended this standard to 
require “exceedingly persuasive” justifications for such 
classifications.174 
While Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena established that both 
invidious and benign racial classifications would receive strict judicial 
scrutiny,175 courts have not issued a similar ruling regarding the 
proper level of analysis for benign gender classifications.176  
According to the logic in Adarand Constructors, Inc., which 
emphasized the incompatibility of national ideals of equality and 
                                                          
 170. See id. (recognizing general judicial reluctance to identify party officials as 
state actors, even where state statutes regulate political parties). 
 171. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 172. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 60-71 (2001) (upholding statute 
imposing additional citizenship qualification criteria for children born abroad and 
out of wedlock to male American citizens as substantially related to the important 
government objectives of confirming the biological relationship between the man 
and the child and guaranteeing the opportunity for the parent and child to cultivate 
a genuine relationship); U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535-40 (1996) (concluding 
that the Commonwealth of Virginia failed to demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for excluding women from the Virginia Military Institute).  “However 
‘liberally’ this plan serves the Commonwealth's sons, it makes no provision whatever 
for her daughters. That is not equal protection.”  Id. at 540.  See also J.E.B. v. 
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.6 (1994) (prohibiting gender-based 
peremptory challenges due to the insufficient relationship between such acts and a 
state’s interest in holding fair and impartial trials); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan 
458 U.S. 718, 730-31 (1982) (striking a public university’s policy prohibiting males 
from enrolling for credit in its nursing school based on the university’s failure to 
establish a substantial relationship between the policy and the goal of remedying past 
educational discrimination against women). The university also failed to establish an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for the gender-based classification.  Id. at 731. 
 173. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 200 (striking down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting 
beer sales to men under twenty-one and women under eighteen as insufficiently 
related to achievement of its objectives of traffic safety). 
 174. See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 732 (sustaining the male plaintiff’s 
equal protection challenge of a public university’s refusal to permit male students to 
enroll for credit in nursing school). 
 175. See 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (requiring heightened scrutiny of government-
imposed racial classifications to protect the individual right to equal protection 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clauses). 
 176. See Christopher D. Totten, Constitutional Precommitments to Gender 
Affirmative Action in the European Union, Germany, Canada, and the United States: 
A Comparative Approach, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 27, 53-54 (2003) (noting that 
previous cases, such as United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Nguyen v. 
I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001), involved invidious gender-based classifications). 
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differential race-based treatment,177 courts would likely apply 
intermediate scrutiny, presently used to analyze invidious gender 
classifications, to benign gender classifications as well.178  Relevant 
political party case law, however, fails to substantiate this 
hypothesis.179  Courts appear to apply a standard of scrutiny less 
rigorous than intermediate scrutiny to such cases, ensuring the 
survival of rules requiring gender-balanced party positions.180  
Particularly given the judiciary’s hesitance to interfere in political 
party matters, equal division rules would likely withstand intermediate 
scrutiny analysis.181 
A. Gender Based Discrimination Analysis 
Equal Protection challenges of the Equal Division Rule brought by 
disgruntled voters against the Democratic Party require the latter to 
prove that the gender classification is substantially related to an 
important party objective.182  The Rule may survive scrutiny even if it 
does not further such objectives with every application.183  Remedying 
past economic discrimination and encouraging equal employment 
opportunity represent permissible bases for gender-based 
classifications.184  The Equal Division Rule and gender-balance 
cases185 extend this framework to permit compensation of women for 
                                                          
 177. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227 (asserting that equal 
protection requires identical, stringent analysis of all racial classifications, regardless 
of their intent). 
 178. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (sustaining, under 
intermediate scrutiny, a Social Security benefits formula that awarded women higher 
monthly benefits than men). 
 179. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (applying rational basis analysis to uphold the 
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule); Ricard, 544 So.2d at 1313-14 (applying 
rational basis analysis to uphold Democratic Party Equal Division Rule); Hartman v. 
Covert, 696 A.2d 788, 790-91 (N.J. 1997) (applying strict scrutiny and invalidating a 
New Jersey statute requiring gender-balanced party leadership); Marchioro, 582 P.2d 
at 492 (applying rational basis and intermediate scrutiny analysis to uphold a 
Washington statute mandating gender-balanced party committees). 
 180. See, e.g., Ripon Soc’y, 525 F.2d at 586-87 (requiring rational basis analysis of 
delegate allocation formulas). 
 181. See, e.g., Holm, 33 N.W.2d at 833-34 (asserting that political, rather than 
legal, entities are best suited to determine the legitimacy of state delegations). 
 182. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (introducing such scrutiny, thereafter labeled 
“intermediate scrutiny,” as the proper analysis for gender-based classification cases). 
 183. See Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 70 (2001) 
(qualifying that gender classification equal protection cases do not always require 
statutes to achieve the anticipated objective to withstand judicial review). 
 184. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (positing that the 
Virginia Military Institute may not use sex classifications to maintain women’s legal, 
social, or economic inferiority). 
 185. See, e.g., Bachur, 836 F.2d at 837 (challenging the Equal Division Rule as 
infringing Party members’ voting rights); Marchioro, 582 P.2d at 489 (asserting that 
statutes mandating election of committee members and chairs of opposite sexes 
24
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss2/4
2005]  DEFENSE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY EQUAL DIVISION RULE 405 
past political discrimination.186 
The Democratic Party adopted the Equal Division Rule not only to 
rectify past discrimination against women, but also to encourage 
women’s active participation as delegates, committee members, and 
party leaders.187  The Party sought to increase women’s presence 
within the organization to parallel the proportion of registered female 
party members.188  More implicitly, the involvement of diverse 
individuals effectively advances Party goals of equality, fairness, and 
liberty.189  The Party’s goals constitute important party objectives.190 
Courts will likely acquiesce in the use of the Equal Division Rule to 
accomplish these objectives because of the direct relationship 
between the Rule and its goals.191  In Craig v. Boren, the Court struck 
down an Oklahoma statute permitting women, but not men, between 
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one to purchase beer.192  The Court 
emphasized the fatally tenuous link between limiting beer sales, but 
not consumption, and enhancing traffic safety where young men were 
responsible for many traffic violations and accidents.193  In Califano v. 
Webster, on the other hand, the Court upheld Social Security benefit 
awards calculated using a formula more favorable to female 
workers.194  The comparatively advantageous benefits that women 
                                                          
violated the Washington Equal Rights Amendment and the First Amendment). 
 186. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 839, 842 (recognizing women’s lack of success in 
delegate elections and “notably deficient” participation in party affairs before 
implementation of the Equal Division Rule).  But see Hartman, 696 A.2d at 792 
(concluding that federal and state anti-discrimination laws have eliminated the 
necessity of statutes mandating gender-balanced party leadership). 
 187. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 767 (explaining the origins of the Equal Division 
Rule).  See generally Abzug et al., supra note 53 (tracing women’s participation in the 
Democratic Party and Party attempts to increase women’s involvement). 
 188. See Bachur, 836 F.2d at 838 (explaining the motivations behind the 
enactment of the Equal Division Rule). 
 189. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. IX, § 17 (“At the heart 
of our party lies a fundamental conviction, that Americans must not only be free, but 
they must live in a fair society.”).  The Democratic Party Credo celebrates the ideals of 
respect, equality, opportunity, democracy, education, and safety.  Id. 
 190. See Wymbs, 719 F.2d at 1083 n.28 (asserting that advocacy of party beliefs, 
nomination of candidates, and recruitment of minorities, women, and youth 
constitute permissible party goals). 
 191. See id. 
 192. 429 U.S. 190 (1975); see also OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 and Supp. 
1976) (barring the sale of “non-intoxicating” beer containing 3.2% alcohol to men 
under twenty-one and women under eighteen). 
 193. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-04 (questioning the validity of the gender 
classification where statistics revealed that police arrested only two percent of men in 
the relevant age group for driving under the influence and where the studies focused 
on alcoholic beverages, rather than beer containing 3.2% alcohol). 
 194. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 314-16 (explaining the formula, which permitted 
women to discount three additional low earning years from their benefits 
calculations).  But see Polelle v. Sec’y of Health, Educ., & Welfare, 386 F. Supp. 443, 
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received attempted to remedy the comparatively disadvantageous 
salaries women earned.195  The Equal Division Rule mirrors the 
benefit payments upheld in Califano in attempting to remedy past 
discrimination.196  The Equal Division Rule, by mandating parity 
among delegates at national conventions, will directly increase 
women’s party activism and further Party goals of equality.197 
The Democratic Party’s exceedingly persuasive justification for the 
implementation of the Equal Division Rule derives from the Party’s 
desire to remedy its longstanding discrimination against women.198  
Previous gender balance attempts fell short of their desired goals, and 
Party leadership ranks remained predominantly male, despite the fact 
that women accounted for around half of the Party membership and a 
majority of the Party’s lower-level staffers.199  In fact, requiring 
proportional representation among delegates serves several beneficial 
functions beyond remedying past discrimination.  First, it provides 
women the opportunity to vote for the party’s presidential 
nominee.200  Because women are more likely than men to support 
women candidates, increasing the proportion of women delegates 
may thus increase the proportion of Democratic women 
candidates.201  In addition, female delegates and candidates reveal 
                                                          
444 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (noting that despite the differential treatment, men continued to 
earn higher monthly benefits than women). 
 195. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 317 (noting that eradication of economic disparities 
between men and women constitutes an “important governmental objective”); see 
also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353, 355 (1974) (upholding an annual $500 
property tax exemption granted to widows, but not widowers, based on the unique 
economic obstacles confronting widows). 
 196. See Califano, 430 U.S. at 318 (explaining that because past earnings 
determine retirement benefit awards, increasing the latter balances out 
discriminatory restraints on the former); see also Bachur, 836 F.2d at 842 (observing 
that the Equal Division Rule legitimately redresses previous discrimination at national 
conventions by ensuring female participation at such events reflects female party 
membership); see also Angela High-Pippert & John Comer, Female Empowerment: 
The Influence of Women Representing Women, 19 WOMEN & POL. 53, 60 (1998) 
(asserting that when women represent women, women are more likely to vote and 
engage in political activities). 
 197. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 20, 23 (articulating the Democratic Party’s 
goal of enhancing women’s participation and representation throughout the 
organization). 
 198. See generally id. (examining the Democratic Party’s poor treatment of 
women politically, financially, and organizationally, and summarizing attempts to 
redress such conduct and increase women’s participation). 
 199. See FREEMAN, supra note 26, at 121 (condemning the entrenched 
discrimination, which restricted women to “making coffee but not policy”); see also 
WOLBRECHT, supra note 39, at 27 (crediting female volunteers as the “grassroots 
backbone” of both major parties, while noting their exclusion from influential 
positions). 
 200. See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-90 (touting the selection of parties’ Presidential 
and Vice Presidential candidates as “a task of supreme importance”). 
 201. See Niven, supra note 124, at 69, 72 (finding that chairwomen demonstrated 
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distinct policy priorities and would thus broaden the Party’s agenda to 
include health care, social service, family, and education issues.202  
Finally, the increased proportion of female delegates will encourage 
other women to become more politically active.203 
B. Affirmative Action Analysis 
In general, judicial disapproval of affirmative action measures 
focuses on practices that create invidious rather than benign 
discrimination.204  On the whole, courts disapprove of quotas, 
preferring flexibility over rigid numerical formulas.205  Courts 
exercise greater lenience when reviewing voluntarily implemented 
affirmative action programs.206  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the 
                                                          
a greater inclination than chairmen to perceive female candidates as likely to succeed 
and thus worthy of endorsement). 
 202. See generally Susan J. Carroll, The Politics of Difference: Women Public 
Officials as Agents of Change, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 12-13 (1994) (finding that 
in the 103d Congress, Congresswomen were more inclined than Congressmen to 
support policies concerning families, health care, and education); Julie Dolan, 
Support for Women’s Interests in the 103rd Congress: The Distinct Impact of 
Congressional Women, 18 WOMEN & POL. 81, 89 (1997) (finding that 
Congresswomen are more prone than Congressmen to support women’s interests); 
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Elected to Lead: A Challenge to Women in Public Office, in 
THE DIFFERENCE DIFFERENCE MAKES: WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP 109, 118 (Deborah L. 
Rhode ed., 2003) (attributing the responsibility for legislation regarding family leave, 
pregnancy discrimination, child support enforcement, and breast and cervical cancer 
to female House members); Thomas H. Little et al., A View from the Top: Gender 
Differences in Legislative Priorities Among State Legislative Leaders, 22 WOMEN & 
POL. 29, 44 (2001) (revealing that female state legislators tend to prioritize health 
care, family issues, and social services more than their male colleagues); Mark J. 
Rozell & Clyde Wilcox, A GOP Gender Gap? Motivations, Policy, and Candidate 
Choice, 19 WOMEN & POL. 91, 98 (1998) (finding that female Republican delegates 
are more liberal than their fellow male delegates on gender and sexual orientation 
issues, but are more conservative regarding education and pornography). 
 203. See Pippert & Comer, supra note 196, at 60, 62 (stating that women 
represented by women tend to be more politically involved, adept, and 
knowledgeable than women represented by men). 
 204. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (noting that plaintiffs 
may establish their equal protection claim by linking the “invidious quality” of the law 
at issue to a racially discriminatory purpose); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 
256, 274 (1979) (establishing that the Court may strike down neutral classifications if 
the statute’s effect reveals invidious gender discrimination).  But see Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking an admissions policy that granted 
additional points to minority applicants to achieve a diverse student body). 
 205. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273 (rejecting an admissions formula that granted 
twenty points based on race where the points usually guaranteed the admission of 
minority applicants).  But see United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171, 177-78 
(1987) (permitting a system in which black employees received half of the 
promotions awarded); United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208 (upholding a program 
reserving half of the spots in an internal training program for black employees).  See 
generally Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1073-80 (Cal. 2000) 
(tracing the judicial transition from steadfast opposition to gradual acceptance of 
benign discrimination measures). 
 206. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987) 
(acknowledging judicial and legislative praise of voluntary action taken to ensure non-
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Equal Division Rule would survive affirmative action analysis based on 
its strict numerical standards,207 its indefiniteness,208 and, arguably, its 
present lack of necessity.209 
When examining affirmative action programs, courts consider the 
purpose of the program, the conditions under which the program is 
implemented, the interests of the affected groups, and the duration of 
the program.210  Courts also scrutinize the availability of alternative 
remedies, the necessity for relief, the flexibility of the program, and 
the relationship of any numerical goals to the applicable market.211  
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court proved receptive to 
the Transportation Agency’s affirmative action plan due to its 
voluntary adoption, its consideration of gender as one of many 
relevant factors, its short-term goal of attaining a more gender-
balanced labor force, its flexibility, and its negligible effect on third 
parties.212 
Similarly, courts would approve of the voluntary establishment of 
the Equal Division Rule after the failure of alternative strategies to 
increase women’s political participation.213  In addition, courts would 
                                                          
discrimination); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) 
(chastising Respondent’s failure to acknowledge the organization’s unilateral 
decision to implement affirmative action measures to eradicate race discrimination); 
see also Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1994) (“Voluntary affirmative action to 
improve the opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and 
protected in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in Title VII.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Gratz, 539 U.S. at 273-74 (rejecting an admissions point system 
because the additional points automatically granted to minority applicants precluded 
examination of applicants’ experiences and ability to enhance student body 
diversity). 
 208. See Back v. Carter, 933 F. Supp. 738, 759 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (warning that 
quotas lacking a specified end date may become outdated because they may extend 
past the time for which they are justified). 
 209. Cf. id. at 758 (noting that women’s participation as candidates in the county 
judicial nominating commission increased as the percentage of women lawyers in the 
county increased). 
 210. See, e.g., United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 197-98, 208 (upholding an 
affirmative action plan implemented to eradicate a racially imbalanced workforce 
where the plan was adopted pursuant to collective bargaining procedures, permitted 
white and black workers to attend the craft training program, and was intended as a 
temporary mechanism). 
 211. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171 (permitting an affirmative action plan that 
mandated the promotion of equal numbers of white and black workers where other 
proposed remedies failed to address persistent discrimination, the program was 
necessary to eradicate discrimination and spur compliance, the program was 
adaptable, the program appropriately reflected the racial composition of the 
workforce, and the program did not unduly burden white applicants). 
 212. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634-42 (emphasizing the program’s establishment to 
combat women’s under-representation in certain positions, incorporation of labor 
force factors into formation of appropriate goals, and emphasis on the qualifications 
of all applicants, regardless of gender). 
 213. See Harvey, supra note 50, at 92-94 (detailing the Democratic and Republican 
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favorably perceive the direct relationship between the Rule’s goal of 
parity in leadership, committee, and delegate positions and women’s 
proportionate representation in the Party’s electoral base.214  
However, courts would disapprove of the Rule’s strict gender-balance 
requirements, questioning the continued need for the Rule given 
women’s political gains over the past two decades.215  The indefinite 
tenure of the Rule would also attract judicial notice.216  Although the 
Democratic Party could note that Party Charter amendment policies 
provide for removal of unwanted provisions, this argument will carry 
little weight due to the relatively onerous task of winning the required 
votes for such a change.217  On the whole, affirmative action 
jurisprudence fails to support the establishment of gender balance 
rules. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal analysis of the Equal Division Rule demonstrates the necessity 
of relying on gender-based classification arguments, rather than 
affirmative action logic, to successfully withstand judicial scrutiny.218  
Proponents should emphasize that the Equal Division Rule does not 
infringe freedom of association or voting rights.219  In fact, parties’ 
delegate selection methods represent non-justiciable political 
                                                          
Parties’ lax enforcement of targeted recruitment efforts). 
 214. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 20 (asserting that the Party’s affirmative 
action measures apply to all state parties and at all levels of the party hierarchy). 
 215. See Marie Cocco, Editorial, A Symbolic Candidate Does NOW Little Good, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 4, 2003, at A35 (noting women’s appointments as cabinet secretaries 
and election as governors, senators, and state officials since 1984); Connie Lauerman, 
Against Great Odds, a Run for the White House: Moseley-Braun’s Campaign Puts Her 
in Select Company, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2003, at C1 (recounting the female 
presidential candidates since Victoria Chalfin Woodhull in 1872, including Shirley 
Chisholm, Lenora Fulani, Patsy Mink, and Elizabeth Dole); Liz Marlantes, She’s Not a 
Candidate . . . Probably, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2003, at 1 (reporting 
speculation regarding Senator Hillary Clinton’s presidential chances in the 2004 
elections). 
 216. See Bachur, 666 F. Supp. at 772 (noting that the Democratic Party Charter, 
which includes provisions similar to the Equal Division Rule, “remains effective and 
binding on the Party”). 
 217. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. X, § 1 (delineating the 
Charter’s amendment procedure, which may occur by majority vote of all delegates to 
the National Convention, pending ratification by a majority of National Committee 
membership; a two-thirds vote of the entire committee membership; or a two-thirds 
vote of the Party Conference membership). 
 218. See supra notes 171-217 and accompanying text (contrasting judicial 
acceptance of gender-balance rules to remedy past discrimination with judicial 
rejection of fixed quotas established for an indefinite duration). 
 219. See supra notes 71-118 and accompanying text (concluding that political 
parties’ expansive associational freedoms encompass party control over candidate 
selection procedures). 
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questions inappropriate for judicial intervention.220  Even if a court 
finds such a claim justiciable, the dearth of state actors will preclude 
judicial condemnation of the Rule.221  Such arguments, however, do 
not ensure the Rule’s survival, given the increasingly conservative 
composition of the federal courts222 and the corresponding 
willingness to strike affirmative action policies as overbroad.223 
The Equal Division Rule enhances the diversity of members and 
perspectives among Party membership and elites.224  In the context of 
the worldwide gender quota movement, such rules provide the most 
realistic option for enhancing women’s political participation in 
United States.  The American electoral system is ill-equipped for the 
establishment of a gender quota law for national office.225  
Furthermore, the controversy surrounding such legislation, as well as 
the desire of the predominantly male Congress to protect their 
electoral opportunities, would discourage many legislators from 
approving such a law.226  In addition, gender quota laws do not 
guarantee women’s electoral success, as demonstrated by the failure 
of the French parity law in the 2002 National Assembly elections.227 
The Equal Division Rule, however, successfully targets grassroots 
political participation in party conventions.228  The Rule encourages 
                                                          
 220. See supra notes 119-151 and accompanying text (finding political parties best 
suited to resolve delegate selection disputes, and noting the difficulty of fashioning 
relief in such matters). 
 221. See supra notes 152-170 and accompanying text (characterizing the Equal 
Division Rule as an internal party decision rather than state action and observing that 
most party leaders involved in primary elections do not constitute state actors). 
 222. See Deborah Sontag, The Intellectual Heart of Conservative America, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 40 (reporting that President Bush’s judicial nominees 
will exacerbate the conservative tilt of the federal courts initially established under 
Presidents Reagan and Bush, Sr.). 
 223. See David A. Strauss, Editorial, Affirmative Action: A Conservative Victory, 
CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2003, at 27 (contending that the Supreme Court rulings in the 
Michigan affirmative action cases represented exceedingly conservative ideology and 
lacked a coherent legal basis). 
 224. See Abzug et al., supra note 53, at 24 (positing the expected consequences of 
the Equal Division Rule as an increase in the Party’s accessibility for, responsiveness 
to, and representation of the Party constituency, and women in particular). 
 225. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 208 (contending that party list proportional 
representation electoral systems prove most amenable to implementation of gender 
quotas). 
 226. See generally JOHN M. CAREY, TERM LIMITS AND LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 
(Cambridge U. Press 1996) (articulating the significance of election to political office, 
even for politicians confronting term limits). 
 227. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 196 (attributing women’s minimal political 
increases to loopholes in the parity law that permitted parties to run women in 
hopeless districts and that provided parties funding even if they disregarded the parity 
requirement). 
 228. See DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHARTER, supra note 6, at art. II, § 4 (mandating 
gender-balanced state delegations at national conventions). 
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political activism at local and state levels, permitting women to gain 
political experience and expertise and develop personal political 
aspirations.229  Indeed, since 1972, the proportion of female 
Democratic delegates has consistently exceeded that of female 
Republican delegates.230  The Democratic Party also boasts a higher 
percentage of female legislators, despite the current Republican 
Congressional majority.231  The Equal Division Rule, then, provides 
balanced representation and creates realistic opportunities for women 
to ascend the political hierarchy. 
                                                          
 229. See Georgia Duerst-Lahti, The Bottleneck: Women Becoming Candidates, in 
WOMEN AND ELECTIVE OFFICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 15, 20-21 (Sue Thomas & 
Clyde Wilcox eds., 1998) (identifying civic experience as an important characteristic 
for an aspiring candidate). 
 230. See generally BECK & SORAUF, supra note 61, at 286 (listing the percentage of 
female delegates between 1968 and 1988); Jo Freeman, Feminist Activities at the 1988 
Republican Convention (reporting that women accounted for approximately thirty-
five percent of the Republican delegates at the 1988 convention), available at 
http://jofreeman.com/conventions/repub88.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo 
Freeman, Women at the 1988 Democratic Convention (recording approximately fifty 
percent female Democratic delegates at the 1988 convention), available at http:// 
jofreeman.com/conventions/dem88.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo Freeman, 
Feminism vs. Family Values: Women at the 1992 Democratic and Republican 
Conventions (stating that women represented fifty percent of the Democratic 
delegates and approximately forty-two percent of the Republican delegates at the 
1992 conventions), available at http://jofreeman.com/conventions/1992 
conven.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo Freeman, Change and Continuity for 
Women at the 1996 Republican and Democratic Conventions (observing that women 
accounted for fifty percent of the Democratic delegates and thirty-four percent of the 
Republican delegates at the 1996 conventions), available at http://jofreeman.com/ 
conventions/1996conven.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); Jo Freeman, Lots of Show 
but Little Substance at the 2000 Republican and Democratic Conventions (estimating 
female delegates’ attendance rates at approximately fifty percent at the Democratic 
convention and thirty-five percent at the Republican convention in 2000), available at 
http://jofreeman.com/conventions/2000conven.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005); 
Ann McFeatters, Political Parties Work to Put Pizazz in Conventions, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, July 14, 2004, at A11 (reporting that women represented half of the 
delegates at the 2004 Democratic convention); 2004 Republican National Convention 
(asserting that women accounted for forty-four percent of the delegates at the 2004 
Republican convention), available at http://www.gopconvention.com/contents/ 
delegates/diversity/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
 231. See Center for American Women and Politics, Women in Elected Office 2005 
Fact Sheet Summaries (calculating fourteen female Senators, including nine 
Democrats and five Republicans, and sixty-six Representatives, including forty-three 
Democrats and twenty-three Republicans), available at http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/ 
Facts/Officeholders/cawpfs.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2005). 
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